Oslo Failed, Part 4: The two-state solution not yet tried

The Oslo Accords have been an astounding failure. The two-state-solution, whereby a Palestinian state will supposedly live in peace alongside the Jewish State of Israel, is no longer believed feasible by many. Especially after Oct 7th. In this series, we looked at three alternatives (1, 2, 3 )to the Palestinian Authority as a unified political entity and now we turn our attention to the original two-state solution: Jordan and Israel.

Yacov Pedhatzur-Wiedhopf gave me permission to translate and re-organize the section of his essay outlining the rationale behind his proposal and the means by which to carry it out. He is a native Israeli whose family has lived in Eretz Yisrael [the Land of Israel], in the city of Tzfat, since 1550. Yacov is a retired executive who holds an M.Sc in Aeronautical Engineering from MIT and an MBA from Stanford University.

With no formal degree in Middle Eastern studies, he has been studying Islam and Arab-Jewish relations since his high school days in the early 1960s. Moreover, he was born and raised in a family which has lived for many generations in Tzfat, Jerusalem, and Tiberius, and grew up hearing first-hand stories about Arab attitudes and life under Muslim rule from the time of the first wave of immigration to the Land of Israel in 1882. (I had the privilege to hear two stories about Lag b’Omer in Tzfat from his aunt.)

“I do something else,” Yacov told me, “I listen to what the Arabs say and I take them seriously and at their word.”

What follows is Yacob’s essay. I added some links to provide sources and further reading.

For more than a century, the world has sought a way to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Proposals have ranged from partition to coexistence, from federation to confederation. Yet none have endured. Today, the international community continues to promote a two-state solution—two peoples, side by side, west of the Jordan River. But what if this vision was built on a fundamental misreading of history, geography, and human nature?

It’s time to revisit the two-state solution that was never truly tried: a Jewish state west of the Jordan, and a Palestinian Arab state to its east. This solution—dividing the land between its two natural and historical communities along the Jordan River—was embedded in the original legal framework following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, and may be the only realistic path to lasting peace.

A Broken Promise and a Distorted Map

In the aftermath of World War I, the Allied powers redrew the Middle East. The Arabs were granted sovereignty over vast swaths of territory. The Jews were promised a national home in historic Palestine—on both sides of the Jordan River. These promises were not symbolic; they were codified in international legal instruments such as the Balfour Declaration and the San Remo Resolution of 1920.

But in 1921, that promise was breached. Britain unilaterally carved off 77% of Mandatory Palestine—east of the Jordan River—to create Transjordan (today’s Jordan), as a reward to Emir Abdullah and his Hashemite clan. What remained—just 23% of the original territory—was left to the Jewish people. That sliver is today’s Israel.

Jordan is no desert anomaly. It is a majority-Palestinian state. Over 70% of its population identifies as Palestinian, and its kings—most notably King Hussein—have publicly declared that “Jordan is Palestine.” Why, then, does the international community insist on creating yet another Palestinian Arab state in the sliver of land left to the Jews?

Why Partition Failed—and Will Keep Failing

The notion of a binational solution west of the Jordan has failed again and again. From the 1937 Peel Commission to the 1947 UN Partition Plan, from Camp David in 2000 to the Clinton Parameters and Olmert’s offer in 2008, each plan was rejected by the Arab side. The issue was never borders—it was sovereignty. Jewish sovereignty.

Even today, Palestinian Authority maps erase Israel completely. Their schoolbooks teach martyrdom, glorify terrorists, and reject the historical connection of the Jewish people to the land. “From the River to the Sea” is not a metaphor. It’s a blueprint.

The conflict, then, is not territorial. It is civilizational. It is about identity, memory, and history. As long as the Palestinian national movement sees Israel’s very existence as illegitimate, coexistence is a fantasy.

A Painful but Proven Path: Separation

History teaches that deep-rooted ethnic conflicts are rarely resolved through proximity. They are resolved through clear and final separation. In recent history alone:

• In 1923, the Treaty of Lausanne led to a population exchange between Greece and Turkey.
• In 1947, Partition saw 15 million Hindus and Muslims relocated between India and Pakistan.
• After WWII, 12 million Germans were expelled from Eastern Europe and resettled in Germany.
• In 1974, Greeks and Turks were relocated following the Turkish invasion of Cyprus.
• And from 1948 to 1970, 800,000 Jews were expelled from Arab countries and resettled in Israel.

In each case, these painful relocations brought an end to generations of bloodshed. No other refugee population—except the Palestinians—was allowed to linger in statelessness for decades. No other group has been allowed to pass down refugee status to their great-grandchildren. Only Palestinian Arabs, under the unique and permanent mandate of UNRWA, have been frozen in time and weaponized against the very idea of Jewish statehood.

This is not a humanitarian policy. It is a political tool to keep the conflict alive.

Israeli Arabs and the Myth of Integration

Since high school in the early 1960s, I have believed that the greatest long-term strategic threat to Israel is not Iran, Hezbollah, or even Hamas—but the Arab sector living within the State of Israel. I believed this when it numbered 300,000, and I believe it now, when it has surpassed 2 million. The threat is not in numbers alone, but in identity.

The Arab citizens of Israel—despite access to modern infrastructure, democratic rights, and economic opportunity—have never fully embraced the idea of Israel as a Jewish state. They see themselves first and foremost as Palestinians—part of the same people in Gaza, Judea and Samaria, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. They mourn what we celebrate. Our Independence Day is their Nakba. These are two narratives that cannot be reconciled.

Many Israelis have clung to the belief that economic integration would breed loyalty. That prosperity would erase memory. But can anyone seriously believe that the descendants of those who fought in 1948 would suddenly “integrate” because they enjoy good healthcare?

When the next uprising comes—and it will—the violence will be far greater that what we have so far seen. The Arab sector has been stockpiling weapons for years. The May 2021 riots were a rehearsal.

Parallel with the physical violence of the Arab sector, verbal radicalization among the leaders of the Arab public has also increased. The Haifa Declaration, authored by leading Arab intellectuals, is a good example. It lays bare the ideology: rejection of Zionism, denial of the Jewish state, and demand for the right of return.

A project that began in 2002 under the auspices of Meda Al-Karmel, an Arab center for social research in Haifa, it was attended by Arab intellectuals, intellectuals, artists, educators, academics and social activists who are identified with the various parties in the Arab public, so it cannot be claimed that this is an unrepresentative minority in the Arab sector.

The Declaration rejects the “Israeli Arab” identity as distorted, and affirms their attachment to the Palestinian people and the Arab nation. They reject Zionism as a colonialist movement whose purpose is to conquer their homeland and turn it into a Jewish state. They list the injustices that the State of Israel has done to the Arabs, starting with the ‘Nakba’, when, according to them, the Zionist movement “perpetrated massacres against our people, turned most of them into refugees, destroyed hundreds of our villages and uprooted most of the inhabitants from our cities.” The ‘Haifa Declaration’ also includes a series of demands: recognition of the refugees’ right of return and recognition of the right of Palestinian citizens as a minority homeland, and changing the definition of the State of Israel from a Jewish state to a democratic state based on national and civil equality between the two national groups. In plain words – the destruction of the Jewish and democratic State of Israel.

On October 7, 2023, as Hamas launched its barbaric massacre, Israeli Arabs were largely silent. Some saw in that silence a sign of restraint. Others even hailed it as a breakthrough—proof that Arabs had begun to identify with the state. But this was wishful thinking. Hamas and Fatah may differ in methods, but not in aims. The destruction of Israel remains the shared goal. Hamas, in their view, jumped the gun. Fatah, with the backing of most Israeli Arabs, plays the long game. And the Haifa Declaration remains intact.

Is this an anomaly or does it reveal an underlying current: Recently, Arab schoolchildren attacked Jewish schoolchildren during a hike near the city of Hadera in north-central Israel. Within moments of their arrival at the spot, the Arab children shot firecrackers at the third-grade Jewish children while shouting “Free free Palestine” and other anti-Israeli cries in both Hebrew and Arabic.

Assimilation is not solving the conflict—it’s masking it.

Islam, Sovereignty, and the Problem of Recognition

At its core, this conflict is not about real estate. It is a civilizational and religious dispute.

In Islam, lands once under Muslim rule are considered a permanent endowment—waqf. For many Muslims, the idea of Jewish sovereignty in any part of the Holy Land is not just a political error, but a theological offense.

This helps explain why peace with Arab states—while growing—is often cold or conditional. Egypt and Jordan have peace treaties with Israel, but cultural, academic, and social hostility remain high. The Abraham Accords represent progress, but their foundation is pragmatic, based on threats from Iran, trade, and U.S. incentives. Should those vanish, so might the good will.

The Case for a Jordanian Palestinian State

Instead of fighting over the last 23% of the land west of the Jordan, why not finally embrace the 77% already in Palestinian hands?

Jordan’s population is already mostly Palestinian. It has functioning institutions, international recognition, and territorial depth. With international support, it could easily absorb the population of Judea and Samaria, grant them citizenship, and become the de facto Palestinian state.

This would require a population transfer—peaceful, compensated, and overseen by international bodies. It would not be without pain. But it would not be ethnic cleansing. It would be a political separation designed to end an intractable conflict.

There is a profound moral difference between expelling a population for who they are, and relocating a population to end endless war.

The Moral Imperative

The moral question is this: is it more ethical to perpetuate an unsolvable conflict in the name of multicultural ideals, or to make a hard choice that gives both peoples a future?

Endless war, generations of refugees, radicalization, and mutual hatred—this is the legacy of our current moral posture.

Every year, children on both sides are born into a struggle that has no end because no one dares to say what is obvious: we cannot share this land. We must divide it—finally, truly, and irreversibly.

The idea of partitioning the land along the Jordan River is not new. It was the original plan. It remains the only one not yet tried.

It’s time we reconsidered it.