Oslo Failed, Part 3: A new future for Judea & Samaria?

Egypt tries to develop a state culture at the expense of Israel based on hatred for the external enemy. Syria does the same. Tribes, however, don’t need an external enemy to galvanize their people because they are legitimate and united by definition.

Prof. Mordechai Kedar’s statement lays the foundation for his proposed Emirates solution for the Arabs in the Palestinian Authority (PA).

In a recent phone interview, Kedar elaborated on his plan. I first asked him to respond to Dan Diker’s revival of the Villages League model, which I discussed in Part 1 of this series:

The Villages League was a successful model developed by Menachem Milson who understands the Middle East. But Peres and Begin cancelled it because they wanted to go with the PA.

I then asked about the concern raised by Diker that the tribes seem to be crime and mafia-like families, seconded by Pinhas Inbari, who, in Part 2 of this series, claimed that peace cannot be based upon crime families. Inbari suggested that working through the chambers of commerce in the Arab towns would be more fruitful. Kedar’s response was unexpected (by me, in any case):

Speaking of crime and mafia families shows a Western approach according to which there is no way to appoint family and friends to positions of power and influence. In the UAE, however, nepotism is the name of the game. Brothers and cousins are in power and that is how it works. To Western eyes, that looks like a crime.

But family members are of the same culture. When a family controls itself – when they are Arabs, wherever they live – they live by this principle. Jabari in Hebron [PA] and Al Nahyan [ruler of Abu Dhabi and President of the UAE] have the same mentality, same ways of behaviour, etc.

One objection to the Emirates plan is economic: The Gulf Emirates have oil. The PA does not. Kedar dismisses this:

I suggest the Emirates system for the Arabs in the PA because it is an emulation of the UAE that works very well in the Gulf. It works because families have a united mindset, not because they have oil. Dubai has no oil and it is Heaven on Earth; Iraq has oil and it is Hell.

We are talking about legitimate administration and not economics. If you have oil you are rich because of the oil; if you don’t have oil, you are rich because of business.

Perhaps we are at a propitious moment for attempting to apply potential solutions that have not yet been tried here. For one thing, over 85% of the PA population want Abbas and other corrupt leaders to go, but many people fear a Hamas takeover. They see what is happening in Gaza and they do not want that to be their fate as well.

Kedar emphasizes that the highest value in Arab society is control. The families, the tribes, all have a presence on the ground. They used to exert control. However, two factors challenge this; to illustrate what he means, Kedar offers the metaphor of a carriage drawn by three horses, each pulling in a different direction: tribalism, Islam, and modernism.

Tribalism is the oldest form of societal structure. About 1400 years ago, Islam arose, and along with it jihadism. Modernism arose 240 years ago and the modern states are an expression of this.

Tribalism, challenged by both jihadism and modernism, is not necessarily hostile to Israel. Peace with Jordan and Egypt are cold. Peace with the UAE, a tribal unit, is warm and respectful.

Kedar explains that a state does not make a nation. That is a curious thing to say, I thought.

There is no Iraqi nation because the citizens are divided into so many groups – they are citizens but they are not one nation. Clans don’t intermarry so the groups don’t dissolve into each other. Someone from Hebron won’t marry someone from Tulkarem or Nablus, for example, even though these are all PA towns. People are more loyal to their religion or sect or tribe than to the state.

Therefore, if you create a state with a conglomerate of clans, you get mayhem, like in Syria. When you have one big clan on which you build a state, it is stable. Should we create a failed state in Judea-Samaria by conglomerating tribes that don’t even marry each other, that speak slightly different languages, that have different mindsets, and even different tribal courts? If people move from the city where they were born to even a neighbouring village, they would feel like strangers.

Or should we create an Emirate system with eight Emirates, each establishing separate bilateral agreements with Israel? The emirates would include: Hebron, Jericho, Ramallah, Tulkarem, Qalqiliya, Nablus, Jenin, and Gaza (which has already existed as a separate “state” for 10 years).

In contrast with these city-Emirates, the villages in the rural areas will become part of Israel and these villagers would be offered full Israeli citizenship.

How do you make a single Emirate in cities like Hebron, where they have tribes that compete against each other? And where Jabari is more connected with Jordan and Qawasme with Hamas, for example, and seem more concerned with killing Jews than building good lives?

In Hebron, there are individuals who identify with Hamas, mainly because they hate the PLO/PA. Clans are able to convince these jihadists to behave, or else … [Kedar left it to my imagination to fill in the ‘or else’]

You should also understand that the clans in Hebron, just like in other cities, have mechanisms to solve any domestic conflict. The main mechanism is mahkama ‘ashairiyya, their tribal courts, which include sheikhs from all the clans and everybody obeys their verdicts.

Will Gaza be a single Emirate? Don’t they have different cities with different clans as well?

Before the war, it was possible to talk about Gaza as a clan system. Since the war began, however, the people are looking for food and shelter, and family frameworks have been shattered to pieces.

Suddenly I wondered about Arab Israeli towns, such as Sakhnin, Umm al-Fahm, Rahat, and Shfaram. I asked Kedar if he thought these might become city-Emirates as well.

Umm al-Fahm, Sakhnin and other Arab towns in Israel have been, in fact, autonomies for long time already, so, yes.

“Hmmm,” I thought to myself. That is a very interesting idea. (Editorial reflection a day after publishing this: This idea has its pros and cons — after all, Jews cannot safely enter some Arab towns in Israel and so the idea of turning them into Emirates makes a certain sense and perhaps would reduce their residents’ hostility toward Israel if Kedar is correct about their society. But taking Israeli sovereign land and turning it over to Arabs?)

Finally, I wondered about the criticism that Kedar’s plan would just be a form of South African Bantustans. . .

Yes, some people try to equate my plan to the Bantustans of South Africa, despite the large differences between Israel and South Africa. However, unlike the whites in SA who had no historic roots in Africa, the Jewish people are the historic owners of the Land of Israel. And when people see how the Palestinian Emirates will provide excellent lives for their citizens, just like the Gulf Emirates, there will be no credibility to this “Bantustan” allegation.

Kedar ended our conversation with this:

Israel will have safety and security and the Palestinian Emirates can make business and be as flourishing as Dubai.

Like every plan proposed so far, the Emirates solution has flaws. But compared to the deep dysfunction of the current reality, it may offer a more workable future — for both Israelis and Palestinians.